Ebenso lesenswert ist die Analyse zur UNMISS, die ebenfalls auf den Seiten des ZIF zu finden ist.

Today, Rwanda has reiterated its invitation to the Sudanese President, who is supposed to attend an AU summit in Kigali starting tomorrow. Even though Rwanda is not a state party to the ICC and consequently under no obligation to arrest the president, it shows the respect that states have for the ICC, which at least in most parts of Africa is not-existent.

The UN Security Council will probably ignore the communications referring to Uganda and Djibouti and it will most likely ignore al-Bashir’s attendance of the AU-summit.

As always, the Prosecutor laments on the Council’s inaction and even ignorance of the ICC’s concerns. Not only is the Council still failing to enforce outstanding arrest warrants, the Council has yet to respond to the ICC’s communications. These refer to failures by state parties to fulfil their obligations under international law. Most prominently, the Prosecutor reports on the aftermath of the unfortunate incident in South Africa last year (here and here). In March 2016, the Supreme Court of Appeal had issued a judgement, in essence upholding a prior condemnation of the governments refusal to fulfill its legal obligations (a review of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgement will follow on these pages). The dreadful event in South Africa has not hindered Omar al-Bashir from traveling freely. This includes visits to Djibouti and Uganda – both state parties to the ICC-Statute – as well as non-state parties.

With regard to the Banda-trial, which had been postponed indefinitely (here and here), the Prosecutor can only repeat that there is no new date for a trial. Banda is still on the loose and not likely to appear in The Hague. The OTP monitors ongoing events in Darfur, even though new investigations are not being opened (here, here and here). The Prosecutor cites several incidents in which casualties have been reported, allegedly also by the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces. Whether or not any proceedings will be opened seems to depend on the actions by the Security Council. And because the Council fails to act, it is likely that no new investigations will be opened in the Darfur-situation.

After her briefing, the Council’s members answered. To no surprise, nothing new was stated. Some states reiterated their opposition to the Court while other members reiterated their support for the Court and joined the Prosecutor in her calls for support. As stated, however, no member state took action. And as usual, the Sudanese representative reacted to the report with the old responses of imperialism, injustice, illegality and the fact that the Darfur-situation demands a peaceful solution to be found within a political process. It is noticeable that the Prosecutor and the Sudanese representative had a bigger clash than in past briefings, even if the hostility has not reached the heights of June 2012, when the predecessor of the current Prosecutor and the Sudanese representative had a major and very personal clash (here).

Again, a report of the OTP illustrates the shortcomings of the Darfur-situation and highlights the need to act. And yet again, the Council fails to act and it will continue to fail. In December 2016, when the 24^th report is due, the report will most likely contain the same aspects, with minor changes in detail.

The Security Council is long aware of the deteriorating situation in Darfur. When the ICC prosecutor reported on the deteriorating situation in Darfur last December (here), she illustrated the situation by detailing incidents involving possible crimes. In Januar 2016, UNAMID reported back to the Council, also outlining a worsening situation (here). In addition, calls to postpone a scheduled referendum in April are publicized on an almost daily basis (here also).

Consequently, the Security Council determined that the “situation in Sudan constitutes a threat to international peace and security”.

With res. 2265 (2016), the Council extended the mandate of the panel of experts created by res. 1591 (2005) until March 2017. The panel is tasked to report to the Council and update it on recent developments. Fulfilling this task the experts regularly report a lack of cooperation by Sudan and other states – something that experts, who are not members of the panel, agree with.

As in the past, the Security Council did not address this situation in a meaningful way. No further measure was taken by the Council except the extension of the mandate. With regard to the arms embargo, travel bans and targeted sanctions, the Security Council expresses its concern for the lack of cooperation by Sudan and other states. It reminds the states of their obligations to fulfill previous resolutions.

In short, res. 2265 (2016) brings nothing new except an extension of the mandate of the panel of experts.

The Under-Secretary General presents the Secretary General’s last report on UNAMID (S/2015/1027). In the time of reporting, clashes had not been numerous. This is supposed to be due to the rain season. Nevertheless, the situation is far from resolved and clashes still happen. Most importantly, several rebel fractions engage in attacks against Sudanese armed forces while the government had declared an unilateral ceasefire. Noteworthy is the fact that the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) did not engage in attacks. The reasons for this remain uncertain.

With regard to the peace process, no substantial progress has been made. Too many opposition groups refrain from the dialogue or are boycotting it for political reasons.

The Under-Secretary General reports also on the humanitarian situation. He highlights that several thousand persons have been displaced during the last weeks. This adds up to an already existing challenge: In April 2016 a referendum is scheduled to take place. Voters will be asked on the administrative status of Darfur. The challenge is, however, to register voters and to let them actually vote. With a very large number of internally displaced persons, this task becomes rather impossible.

The operation of UNAMID itself is not running smoothly. For one, UNAMID convoys and personnel are attacked regularly. Moreover, access to specific areas is still limited by the Sudanese Government. This does not only hold true for actual access on the ground but also into Sudan itself: Visa requests by the UN for UN staff are denied on a regular basis. As consequence, UNAMID suffers from a “high vacancy rate in key substance sections”, as the Under-Secretary General reports.

To summarize, UNAMID is still confronted with old obstacles. A solution is not in sight.

Update 4 February 2016: According to a recent press release, Sudan’s national dialogue conference calls to postpone the referendum (see here).

Update 9 February 2016: Yesterday began voter registration for the referendum. However, Sudan’s IDP association calls to boycott the referendum (here).

The Special Criminal Court was set up to deal with alleged violations of international law. The Sudanese government intended to conduct (or rather pretended to intent) national criminal proceedings which in turn would have made investigations by the ICC superfluous. The current example is yet another demonstration of how Sudan is not willing to conduct domestic trials. As the Sudan Tribune reports, until today no Sudanese officials were charged with crimes under review by the ICC. In short, the issue of subsidiary jurisdiction (cf. art. 17 Rome Statute) by the ICC is none.