As always, the Prosecutor laments on the Council’s inaction and even ignorance of the ICC’s concerns. Not only is the Council still failing to enforce outstanding arrest warrants, the Council has yet to respond to the ICC’s communications. These refer to failures by state parties to fulfil their obligations under international law. Most prominently, the Prosecutor reports on the aftermath of the unfortunate incident in South Africa last year (here and here). In March 2016, the Supreme Court of Appeal had issued a judgement, in essence upholding a prior condemnation of the governments refusal to fulfill its legal obligations (a review of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgement will follow on these pages). The dreadful event in South Africa has not hindered Omar al-Bashir from traveling freely. This includes visits to Djibouti and Uganda – both state parties to the ICC-Statute – as well as non-state parties.

With regard to the Banda-trial, which had been postponed indefinitely (here and here), the Prosecutor can only repeat that there is no new date for a trial. Banda is still on the loose and not likely to appear in The Hague. The OTP monitors ongoing events in Darfur, even though new investigations are not being opened (here, here and here). The Prosecutor cites several incidents in which casualties have been reported, allegedly also by the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces. Whether or not any proceedings will be opened seems to depend on the actions by the Security Council. And because the Council fails to act, it is likely that no new investigations will be opened in the Darfur-situation.

After her briefing, the Council’s members answered. To no surprise, nothing new was stated. Some states reiterated their opposition to the Court while other members reiterated their support for the Court and joined the Prosecutor in her calls for support. As stated, however, no member state took action. And as usual, the Sudanese representative reacted to the report with the old responses of imperialism, injustice, illegality and the fact that the Darfur-situation demands a peaceful solution to be found within a political process. It is noticeable that the Prosecutor and the Sudanese representative had a bigger clash than in past briefings, even if the hostility has not reached the heights of June 2012, when the predecessor of the current Prosecutor and the Sudanese representative had a major and very personal clash (here).

Again, a report of the OTP illustrates the shortcomings of the Darfur-situation and highlights the need to act. And yet again, the Council fails to act and it will continue to fail. In December 2016, when the 24^th report is due, the report will most likely contain the same aspects, with minor changes in detail.

However, with the 20^th report of the Prosecutor being delivered in December 2014 and marking the start into 2015, the prospect of a good year for the Darfur-situation was already dark. In said report, the Prosecutor announced a halt to further investigations into Darfur (here). She cited the missing support by the Security Council as a major drawback in the ICC’s efforts with regard to Darfur. In 2015, the Security Council was not impressed by her outcry and continued to ignore the calls for help. This is evident from the new 22^nd report of the OTP to the Security Council. In detail, the Prosecutor highlighted the following points.

Omar a-Bashir’s travels

Unsurprisingly, Sudan’s head of state Omar al-Bashir continues to travel freely. 2015 was marked by a failed attempt to arrest him during an African Union summit in South Africa (here and here). Still, the second half of 2015 had al-Bashir travel to Mauretania, China, South Sudan, Algeria, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India and the United Arab Emirates. Not one of these nine states is a state party to the ICC; thus, they are not obliged to arrest al-Bashir. Nevertheless, the referral by the Security Council asked non-member-states to cooperate with the ICC. With regard to the defiance by South Africa in the summer of 2015, this member state is currently asked to detail the domestic judicial proceedings surrounding the AU summit. Whether or not something helpful will come out of that remains to be seen.

Lack of cooperation

As usual, two key actors refuse to cooperate with the ICC, rendering its efforts useless and hampering the enforcement of international criminal justice.

First, Sudan is still not cooperating with the Court. Albeit obliged to do so by Security Council res. 1593 (2005), Sudan is not willing to fulfill its obligations under international law. This is nothing new and it does not need to be stressed further.

As an interesting side note, the Sudanese representative has cited the November 2015 Paris Climate Change Conference and its impact on the conflict in Darfur. With climate change being one cause for the deterioration of the situation in Darfur, he highlights the need for a comprehensive approach. While the representative has a point, other factors are more essential. While climate change has contributed to clashes between different groups of people in Darfur, the real driving forces behind the conflict are not natural forces, but politics and policies. This, of course, is withhold by the Sudanese representative.

Second, the Security Council is still not willing to back up its referral. In spite of numerous of its own resolutions and several and regular cries for help by the ICC, the Court’s submissions to the Council continue to be ignored. Communications received by the Council are not answered. Within the debate following the report by the Prosecutor, states were reluctant to promise more support. Even France, a long-term supporter of the ICC, prioritizes other aspects of the conflict before addressing the lack of support. It seems as if the Council’s member states have lost their faith in international criminal justice (which is due to its own failure to act).

Further activities

As she promised earlier (here) the Prosecutor monitors ongoing events in Darfur. Within the last six months there have been aerial attacks in Darfur, gender-based crimes and crimes against peace-keepers. The Prosecutor specifies in her report that nobody really knows how many of these crimes are due to the conflict between the government and rebel forces or to intertribal clashes. Unfortunately, these events will not be investigated any further until more support is granted by the international community.

The Prosecutor adds that eight victims of alleged crimes have withdrawn from the al-Bashir case, citing a confidential settlement. She is eager to point out that her office is not abandoning the victims and continues to call for arrest and surrender of those allegedly responsible for the crimes.

Remarkably, the report is silent on the incident at Tabit. Whatever happened there will probably never be known (more here). Finally, the case against Abdallah Banda is not moving forward. A new starting date has not been set and Banda is still on the lose.

Summary

In the end, the 22^nd report does not bring anything new. The situation is still on hold due to the Sudan and the Security Council continuing to ignore the ICC. One does not need to be a prophet to foresee that the 23^rd report due in June 2016 will include the same areas of concern, the same lack of cooperation by Sudan and the same lack of support by the Security Council.

The report comes after a diplomatic brawl over an attempt to arrest Omar al-Bashir during an African Union summit in South Africa (more in analysis no. 15).

The failed attempt to arrest Omar al-Bashir

In June 2015 the AU held a summit in South Africa. Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, was representing his state at the summit. Despite two arrest warrants by the ICC on accounts of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, al-Bashir enjoys the support of many African states, including the AU which has repeatedly criticized the ICC’s policy with regard to Africa. He travels freely throughout the continent. In light of that history, it is not surprising that the president visited the AU summit.

Still, South Africa is a state party to the ICC-statute. As such, there is no doubt that South Africa is under an obligation to arrest Omar al-Bashir. This has not only been hold by several non-governmental organizations, but by the ICC as well: The ICC had consultations with South African Officials in which the obligation of South Africa to arrest Omar al-Bashir was discussed. (Registry Report on the consultations undertaken under Article 97 of the Rome Statute by the Republic of South Africa and the departure of Omar Al Bashir from South Africa on 15 June 2015, ICC-02/05-01/09-243).

In addition, a domestic court found clear words for the South African government. After the North Gauteng High Court in Pretoria found the government of South Africa under a domestic obligation to arrest Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s president managed to board a plane and leave the country for Sudan. In the end, it is evident that the South African government’s failure to act constitutes a violation of the Rome Statute (cf. here).

No immunity for Omar al-Bashir

Also, Omar al-Bashir has as a sitting head of state no immunity from criminal prosecution. Customary international law may provide for such a immunity. However, for state parties to the Rome Statute, art. 27 removes this protection. Sudan, a non-member state, is not bound by art. 27 Rome Statute and thus al-Bashir is not stripped of his immunity by this provision. However, being a member state of the UN, Sudan must adhere to chapter VII-resolutions of the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council removed his immunity by Res. 1593 (2005), which referred to the Rome Statute (cf. here)

Troubling is the stance of several members of the Security Council, including permanent members of the Council as well as elected members and state parties to the ICC-statute, who maintain that al-Bashir is immune from the ICC’s prosecution. In this sense, their view is simply incorrect and Omar al-Bashir does not enjoy immunity from the ICC’s jurisdiction.

It comes to no surprise that the Sudanese government failed to arrest Omar al-Bashir and Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, the Sudanese minister of defense. With regard to al-Bashir, the Court already issued a decision, holding that the non-compliance violates international obligations of Sudan. With regard to Hussein, the decision is pending.

In this sense, the report does not report any news.

Banda-Trial postponed indefinitely

The Prosecutor is also not able to report any news in the Banda-case. He is still on the run and a date for the trial has not been set (cf. here).

Continued hibernation in light of ongoing violence

In her last report the Prosecutor announced a halt to all investigations in Darfur. In the present report, she details her strategy a little more: Resources of the OTP are allocated to prioritized cases that are more advanced. With regard to Darfur, not a single case is likely to be tried in the near future. However, the OTP continues to monitor the situation in Darfur, focusing on recent crimes and even interviewing witnesses to safe their testimony.

This is in part due to the ongoing violence in Darfur, as the Prosecutor reports. Until today, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary unit, are committing crimes in Darfur. The Prosecutor names three individuals allegedly somehow responsible. Among them are two RSF-leaders, Major General Abdual-Aziz and commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as “Hemeti”, and the National Intelligence Security Service’s (NISS) General Ali al-Nasih al-Galla. Hemeti has been in the focus of the OTP for quite some time and was mentioned in the Prosecutor’s 19^th report a year ago.

Of course, during the debate after the Prosecutor gave her report to the Security Council, the Sudanese representative denounced these claims. He even went so far as to re-address the legitimacy and legality of SC Res. 1593 (2005).

(No) Mass rape in Tabit?

Suspiciously, any reference to the alleged mass rape in Tabit is missing from the OTP’s report (cf. here and here). The sole representative regularly referring to the incident is the UK representative. When the Security Council extended the mandate of UNAMID with Res. 2228 (2015) on the same day as the Prosecutor delivered her report, the UK representative reiterated her countries worries about the incident (and she was supported by the US representative). The Sudanese representative, quite the reverse, denounced these allegations and labeled the accusations an “information war” by “certain players to scale up pressure on the Sudan.”

Persistently ignoring the ICC

Not surprising, but disturbing is the persistent neglect of the Darfur-situation by the Security Council. Six months after the Prosecutor’s surrender to the unwillingness of the Council, its members seem happy with the situation. Even tough some members call upon the Council to act, no one undertakes credible steps. For the nearly 1.200 victims of the crime in Darfur since the beginning of 2015, the Security Council is still a disappointment.

In preparation of the trial against Abdallah Banda, the Trial Chamber issued a warrant of arrest in September 2014. The accused appealed against this decision and in March 2015, the Appeals Chamber ruled on the appeal (here). The Chamber’s decision under review in this blogpost confirms the Trial Chamber’s judgment (for a review of the Trial Chamber’s decision cf. here).

At the outset, it is important to note that the Appeals Chamber sees its task not in reviewing the substantial decision of the Trial Chamber: Whether or not an arrest warrant or a summons to appear is beyond the decision here reviewed, as explicitly stated by the Appeals Chamber. Instead, the Chamber reviews whether the Trial Chamber should have provided the appellant with a further opportunity to present submissions on the choice between arrest warrant and summons to appear (para. 27).

This makes the decision somewhat less interesting, a purely procedural matter that is rather easy to agree with.

In the end, the Chamber does not find the approach taken by Banda convincing. Banda bases his appeal on the principle of audi alteram partem, which the Appeals Chamber defines as “[h]ear the other side; hear both sides. No man should be condemned unheard” (http://thelawdictionary.org/audi-alteram-partem/) (fn. 55).

The Appeals Chamber reiterates that it will review the Trial Chamber’s exercise of its discretion only

“where it is shown that that determination was vitiated by an error of law, an error of fact, or a procedural error, and then, only if the error materially affected the determination. This means in effect that the Appeals Chamber will interfere with a discretionary decision only under limited conditions. The jurisprudence of other international tribunals as well as that of domestic courts endorses this position. They identify the conditions justifying appellate interference to be: (i) where the exercise of discretion is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law; (ii) where it is exercised on patently incorrect conclusion of fact; or (iii) where the decision is so unfair and unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” (para. 30).

For this, the appellant bears the burden to substantiate the material effect of an alleged procedural error (para. 29).

The Chamber notes that Banda failed to substantiate his claim. In addition to the rather general recourse to audi alteram partem he “does not put forth any legal argument in support of the contention that the procedural step of inviting further submissions was required as a matter of law“ (para. 31). This seems to be the decisive aspect of the case: Not that Banda was not heard at all – presumably amounting to a violation of audi alteram partem – but the chance to further submissions (the Appeals Chamber puts ‘further’ in italics throughout the decision).

In the end, the Appeals Chamber let’s the Trial Chamber’s arrest warrant stand. There is not word on the question of whether an arrest warrant was required or a summons to appear would have been enough to prepare the trial against Banda.

You may find the newest analysis in the database as well as online. It analyses the warrant of arrest against Abdullah Banda from September 2014.

I       Introduction

1     Abdallah Banda is Commander-in-Chief of the Justice and Equality Movement-Collectiv Leadership. Jointly with Saleh Jerbo, he is allegedly responsible for the 2007 attack on peacekeepers in Haskanita, South Darfur. Banda is allegedly criminally responsible as co-perpetrator for war crimes under article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute. While Jerbo is supposedly dead, the trial against Banda had been prepared during the last years.

2     In August 2009, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a summons to appear. Subsequently, Banda appeared before the Pre-Trial Chamber in June 2010 where he was informed about the crimes which he is alleged to have committed. On this occasion, he waived his right to be present at the confirmation of charges hearing which took place in December 2010. In March 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber I unanimously confirmed the charges against Banda and committed him to trial.

3     A first starting date had been set for May 2014. Due to organizational difficulties, however, Trial Chamber IV vacated the date after consulting with prosecution and defence and set a new date. According to the Chamber’s schedule, the trial was to begin on 18 November 2014.

4     The decision presently under review vacated this date, suspended preparatory measures for the trial and issued an arrest warrant.

II    The legal base for the decision

5     When the charges against Banda were confirmed, the Presidency established Trial Chamber IV which succeeded in the powers held by the Pre-Trial Chamber. According to art. 61 (11) ICC-Statute, the new Trial Chamber became responsible for the conduct of subsequent proceedings.

6     In order to prepare the trial against Banda, Trial Chamber IV was concerned about the appearance of the accused before the ICC. Also, the Prosecutor requested the Chamber to issue an order requiring an undertaken from the accused that he will appear for trial. After a status conference was held, Trial Chamber IV found it necessary to review the summons to appear from 2009.

7    The Trial Chamber is competent to do so. After all, the power to review a decision has already been claimed by the Pre-Trial Chamber which reserved “its right to review this finding either propio motu or at the request of the Prosecutor, however, particularly if the suspects fail to appear on the date specified in the summons or fail to comply with the orders contained therein.“ As already stated, this review-power was by art. 61 (11) and 64 (6) (a) ICC-Statute transferred to the Trial Chamber when the charges were confirmed

8     Given the envisaged timeframe, the Chamber in 2014 seized the opportunity to review the summon to appear and revisited the facts.

III  Voluntary appearance or need for arrest?

9     Due to “latest developments” (para. 20), the Trial Chamber finds it better suited to issue a warrant of arrest. Its reasoning is based on art. 58 (8) ICC-Statute, which is understood by the judges as to require the accused to be personally willing to appear and to be in a position to do so (para. 22).

10  Troubling, however, the Chamber does not care about the first requirement. The majority explicitly states “regardless of whether Mr Banda wishes or not to be present at trial” (para. 21), an arrest warrant is the smarter way to procede. This approach may be due to the defence’s announcement that the accused was in fact willing to appear before the ICC. The Chamber seems to look for something else to justify a warrant of arrest and is not prepared to let the summon to appear stand.

11  It finds a solution in earlier jurisprudence. Referrencing the decision regarding the warrant of arrest for Ali Kushayb from 2007, the chamber notes that an individual needs to be in a position to voluntarily appear in The Hague. Ali Kushayb was imprisoned at the time, hence his appearance did not depend on his willingness. This lead the chamber to issue an warrant of arrest. Even then, this reasoning was not overall convincing, it is even less convincing in the Banda-case.

12  The aforementioned “latest developments” refer to the Sudanese Government’s behavior. Its standpoint on the ICC is well known, the outright rejection of the ICC and the government’s refusal to cooperate have paralyzed the ICC’s work during the last years. As of now, the government has developed an attitude that is hallmarked by arrogance: When the Registry submitted a cooperation request to the Sudanese embassy in The Hague on 31 July 2014, this letter was returned unopened to the ICC on 15 August 2014.

13  The approach choosen by the Trial Chamber is flawed. The Chamber’s construction of the decision on the behavior of Sudan and not on the behavior of the accused is ignoring the fundamentals of international criminal law. As pointed out by Judge Eboe-Osuji in his dissenting opinion, one needs to keep in mind that international criminal law is about individual criminal responsibility. Decisive for the choice between a summon to appear and an arrest warrant is consequently the behavior of the accused. The Trial Chamber is effectively sanctioning Banda for the government’s failure to cooperate.

14  Furthermore, the reference to the Ali Kushayb-decision goes astray. While in this case, the accused was known to be in prison, in the present case the accused’s whereabouts are unknown. It is, however, not for the ICC to always know where the accused is present. As long as there is no record of non-appearance or of an unwillingness to appear, the chamber should not assume that an accused will not appear. Banda’s appearance record has been good, as stated by the dissenting judge.

15  Moreover, to issue a warrant of arrest against an individual that is under protection by the Sudanese government trivializes the arrest warrants issued by the ICC. There exists one additional warrant which will not be executed by the Sudanese government.

16  Judge Eboe-Osuji is also correct when he asserts that the Trial Chamber has no power to suspend all preparatory measures (para. 25, dissenting opinion para. 26). It shows a lack of interest to trial the case by the majority in addition to there not being a base for that in the Rome-Statute.

IV   Conculsion

17  The Trial Chamber’s majority bases its decision on a flawed approach to art. 58 ICC-Statute. There was no need to issue a warrant of arrest. The dissenting opinion by Judge Eboe-Osuji is to be followed. It would be advisable if the Chamber revisited its own decision in the future.

Download the Analysis here.

The 20^th report of the prosecution to the Security Council is basically limited to issues already known. In addition to the aforementioned announcement, other developments complicate the ICC’s work.

Banda-Trial postponed

The trial against Banda was supposed to begin in May, however, Trail Chamber IV postponed the commencement until 18 November 2014 (here). Still, this date was not realizable as well. When the Trail Chamber IV issued a warrant of arrest for Banda (more will follow in this blog), the Chamber simultaneously vacated the set date and postponed the begin until his arrest or voluntary appearance. This is also due to the unwillingness of Sudan to cooperate with the Court.

The Prosecutor gives one example which speaks volumes: In July 2014, the Court requested Sudan to cooperate and to facilitate Banda’s appearance before the Court. Sudan is by international law, namely by Security Council resolution 1593 (2005), bound to cooperate with the ICC. This being the case, the request to cooperate by the ICC did not impose new obligations on Sudan. Coming back to the example, Sudan returned the envelope with the written request unopened to the Court. The disrespect for the Court as well as the Security Council could not have been expressed more pretentiously. Unfortunately, while the ICC cares, the Security Council has forsaken the Court and is once again not interested in successful international criminal justice.

Omar al-Bashir’s Travels

This is clear from the Council’s reluctance to address the issue of non-cooperation by other states. More specifically, state parties to the ICC-Statute are bound to cooperate with the Court. In particular, those states are under an obligation to arrest persons wanted with an arrest warrant by the ICC. Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s president, is one of those persons. Nevertheless, he travels freely throughout Africa and even African state parties to the ICC decline any request for help by the ICC. This is not new. It is also not new that the Security Council does not support the ICC. Moreover, the communications sent by the ICC to the Council, addressing instances of non-compliance with the Council’s own resolution, are ignored. The ICC still awaits responses to its letters.

The statements by the member’s of the Security Council after the OTP’s report are hypocritical. Some representatives concede that answers are necessary. However, nothing has been done in order to answer the requests. It seems highly unlikely that this will happen in the future.

Alleged Mass Rape in Tabita and UNAMID-reporting

“The recent allegations of rape of approximately 200 women and girls in Tabit should shock this Council into action.” With these clear words the Prosecutor addressed the Security Council and its “concerns” regarding the humanitarian situation in Darfur. The answer of the Council? Some members deny the facts and maintain that no evidence has been found to support this claim. Other members point out that no independent inquiry took place, because the Sudanese government did not grant access.

This comes in addition to alleged flawed reporting by UNAMID. The mission has been criticized for taking sides in the conflict and shielding government officials from prosecution (based on a series of three articles by Foreign Policy: 1, 2 and 3). The Prosecutor addresses the issue only briefly, referring to a report prepared for the Secretary General (here). The report found no evidence “to support the allegation that UNAMID had intentionally sought to cover up crimes against civilians and peacekeepers.” However, the report also found that in several instances UNAMID did not provide UN Headquarters with all information about the incidents. (To be fair to the Security Council, when it renewed UNAMID’s mandate until summer 2015 by resolution 2173 (2015), it welcomed the Secretary Genereal’s announcement to investigate said allegations.)

Grim Outlook on the 21^st report

It does not take a crystal ball to have a grim outlook on the next report. After all, we have seen what happens after the prosecution begs for support in New York. In June 2015 the OTP will once again lament on the lack of cooperation by Sudan and other states, the Security Council’s unwillingness to address instances of non-cooperation as well as the further postponement of trials and execution of arrest warrants. That the OTP continues to monitor alleged crimes in Darfur does not brighten the outlook and it does certainly not help the people in Darfur.

Prozess gegen Banda soll im November beginnen

Dabei bestand im Dezember 2013 durchaus Anlass zur Hoffnung: Der erste Prozess gegen den Beschuldigen Abdallah Banda sollte am 5. Mai 2014 eröffnet werden. Doch aufgrund logistischer Schwierigkeiten, die unter anderem Übersetzungsproblemen geschuldet sein sollen, wurde der Prozessbeginn zunächst auf unbestimmte Zeit verschoben. Die Verteidigung meinte, in einem Jahr starten zu können, während die Anklägerin auf einen Beginn im Oktober 2014 drängte. Gestern, am 14. Juli, hat die VorvVerfahrenskammer IV den Prozessbeginn auf den 18. November 2014 festgelegt. Wie die Kammer ihre Entscheidung begründet, kann leider der offenen Version der Entscheidung nicht entnommen werden. Ob es bei dem Termin bleiben wird, bleibt abzuwarten.

Weitere Staatsbesuche von Omar al-Bashir…

Frustriert bleibt die Anklägerin von den zahlreichen Staatsbesuchen des sudanesischen Präsidenten Omar al-Bashir der auch im letzten Berichtszeitraum Reisen sowohl in Vertragsstaaten des IStGH-Statuts als auch in Nichtvertragsstaaten unternommen hat (dazu auch hier und hier).

Die Vertragsstaaten des Status sind dabei über das IStGH-Statut und die Sicherheitsratsresolution 1593 (2005) zur Kooperation verpflichtet. Im Fokus des Berichts steht vor allem der Besuch al-Bashirs in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo zu Beginn des Jahres.

Die Nichtvertragsparteien sind hingegen nicht zur Kooperation verpflichtet, auch wenn der Sicherheitsrat in der besagten Überweisungsresolution 1593 (2005) die Staaten zu eben dieser Kooperation angehalten hat. Im Jahr 2014 war al-Bashir unter anderem in Äthiopien und Kuwait, beides sind keine Vertragsstaaten des Statuts.

…und weiter mangelnde Unterstützung der internationalen Gemeinschaft

Leider wird al-Bashir auch in Zukunft weiter unbehelligt durch Afrika und den Rest der Welt reisen können.

Dafür ist vor allem der Sicherheitsrat selbst verantwortlich. Wie sowohl die Kammern des Gerichtshofs als auch die Anklägerin bereits mehrfach betont haben, hängen effektive Strafverfolgung und ultimativ die Glaubwürdigkeit von Strafgerichtshof und Sicherheitsrat von einer wirksamen Nachsorge des Sicherheitsrats ab. Ohne eigene Vollstreckungsorgane ist der Gerichtshof tatsächlich vor allem davon abhängig, dass der Sicherheitsrat Ernst macht und den Staaten und Organen des IStGH eine völkerrechtliche Rechtsgrundlage an die Hand gibt oder die Verfahren anderweitig unterstützt. Dazu können verschärfte Sanktionen gegen den Sudan selbst oder auch gegen solche Vertragsstaaten des IStGH gehören, die ihren Verpflichtungen nicht nachkommen. Erstaunlich ist in diesem Zusammenhang auch die Hilflosigkeit der Vertragsstaatenversammlung, die Vertragsbrüche immer wieder toleriert.

Wie bereist erwähnt sind Änderungen nicht zu erwarten. Den Versprechen der Sicherheitsratsmitglieder, den IStGH zu unterstützen, kann man keinen Glauben schenken. Dabei muss man nicht so weit gehen, auf die fehlende Nachsorge zu verweisen. Denn inzwischen haben die Kammern des IStGH allein in der Darfur-Situation acht Mitteilungen über mangelnde Kooperationsgemeinschaft an den Sicherheitsrat gemacht. Deren Eingang ist bislang nicht einmal bestätigt worden, geschweige denn hat eine inhaltliche Auseinandersetzung damit stattgefunden.

Darüber hinaus ist die Anregung der Anklägerin, diplomatische Beziehungen mit dem Sudan (auch von Seiten der UN) auf der Ebene von “non-essential contacts” zu suspendieren, nicht aufgenommen worden. Im Ergebnis, so die Anklägerin zu Recht, verpuffen die bislang 55 Sicherheitsratsresolutionen in Bezug auf Darfur. Deutlich wird dies auch daran, dass kein Vertreter des Sudan an der Sitzung des Sicherheitsrates teilgenommen hat. Damit straft der Sudan den IStGH mit Nichtachtung.

Auch bleiben die Afrikanische Union (AU) und ihre Mitgliedstaaten auf Konfrontationskurs zum IStGH. Die AU bekräftigt regelmäßig ihre Entschlossenheit, nicht mit dem IStGH zu kooperieren. Nur wenige Tage nach dem Bericht der Anklägerin haben die Mitgliedstaaten beschlossen, amtliche Immunität auch vor dem neuen Afrikanischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte gelten zu lassen.

Auf Hilfe dürfen daher weder die Menschen in Darfur noch die Organe des Gerichtshofs hoffen.

Verschlechterung der humanitären Situation in Darfur

Hilfe ist dabei dringend erforderlich, um die Lage zu verbessern. Seit Jahresbeginn 2014 sind mehrere hunderttausend Menschen vertrieben worden. Der Bericht spricht von mehr als 250.000 Menschen, wobei anderen Quellen zufolge ungefähr 320.000 Menschen ihre Heimat verlassen mussten.

Seit Jahresbeginn kommt es vermehrt zu Kämpfen. Die Anklägerin schildert diese in eindrucksvoller Weise und hebt die Operationen der Rapid Support Forces (RSF) besonders hervor. Die RSF sind eine paramilitärische Gruppe, die im Auftrag der sudanesischen Zentralregierung in Darfur kämpft. Dabei fällt der Name eines Kommandieren, Mohamed Hamdan, der auch als “Hemeti” bekannt ist, immer wieder. Zwischen den Zeilen liest man, dass Hemeti ggf. als nächster mit einem Haftbefehl zu rechnen hat. Dass dies ein sinnvoller Schritt ist, muss im Angesichts der Wirkungslosigkeit der Strafverfolgung bezweifelt werden. Hemeti hätte, soviel steht fest, wenig Grund, Den Haag zu fürchten.

Im Ergebnis bringt auch der 19. Bericht nichts Neues und vor allem keine Lösung für die Schwierigkeiten, vor denen der IStGH steht. Ob der Prozess gegen Banda tatsächlich im November starten wird, bleibt abzuwarten. Dass die Anklägerin bei ihrem 20. Bericht im Dezember wieder die Untätigkeit des Sicherheitsrates beklagen wird, ist dagegen keine gewagte Voraussage.

Prozess gegen Banda

Die einzig wirkliche Neuigkeit ist, dass der erste Prozess gegen einen der Beschuldigten demnächst beginnen wird. Geplant ist, das Verfahren gegen Abdallah Banda am 5. Mai 2014 zu eröffnen. Banda wird sich dann wegen des Vorwurfs der Kriegsverbrechen vor der IV. Kammer verantworten müssen. Die Anklägerin betont, dass dies vor allem aufgrund des freiwilligen Erscheinens von Banda möglich ist. Ohne die Mitwirkung des Beschuldigten, so scheint es, finden Verfahren nicht statt.

Das Verfahren gegen Saleh Jerbo, der aufgrund des gleichen Vorfalls wie Banda per Haftbefehl gesucht wurde, ist im Oktober eingestellt worden, nachdem bereits im Sommer von seinem Tod berichtet wurde (vgl. hier).

In anderen Verfahren sichert die Anklagebehörde derzeit vor allem Beweise. Darüber hinaus beobachtet die Behörde die Vorgänge in Darfur, um ggf. weitere Verfahren zu eröffnen. Der Bericht zeigt, dass noch immer Verbrechen begangen werden, die von Luft- und Landangriffen auf Zivilpersonen über Angriffe auf internationales Hilfspersonal bis zu Vorfällen sexueller und geschlechterbasierter Gewalt reichen. Zwar ist die sich verschlechternde Sicherheitslage ein großes Problem für die Ermittler – verheerend aber ist nach Aussagen der Anklägerin die mangelnde Kooperation der internationalen Gemeinschaft.

Mangelnde Unterstützung bei ausstehenden Haftbefehlen

Denn die vier übrigen Beschuldigten haben weiterhin nichts zu befürchten. Dies gilt vor allem für Omar al-Bashir, der weiterhin Präsident des Landes ist, und Abdel Hussein, den amtierenden Verteidigungsminister.

Dass der Sudan selbst nicht tätig wird ist keine Überraschung. Änderungen im Verhalten sind nicht zu erwarten. Zusätzlich aber legt die Anklägerin dem Sicherheitsrat eine Liste von Vorfällen vor, in denen Staaten ihrer Kooperationspflicht mit dem IStGH nicht nachgekommen sind. Innerhalb des letzten halben Jahres sind Reisen von al-Bashir und Hussein nach Nigeria, Äthiopien, Saudi-Arabien, Kuwait, Zentralafrikanische Republik und den Tschad bekannt geworden. Besonders zu bedauern, so die Anklägerin, sind die Reisen nach Nigeria, in den Tschad und in die Zentralafrikanische Republik, da diese Staaten Vertragsparteien des IStGH sind. Trotz der Aufrufe des Gerichtshofs an diese Staaten, die gesuchten Personen festzunehmen, ist bislang nichts geschehen. Darin wird sich vermutlich auch in Zukunft nichts ändern, solange die Afrikanische Union ihren Widerstand gegen den IStGH nicht aufgibt.

Seine Reise zur VN-Generalversammlung nach New York, die für September 2013 geplant war, hat der sudanesische Präsident hingegen nicht angetreten. Dies dürfte aber nicht der Angst vor dem IStGH geschuldet sein. Dass ausgerechnet die USA mit dem IStGH kooperieren und al-Bashir verhaftet hätten, darf durchaus bezweifelt werden.

Die Anklägerin wird deutlicher als sonst und klagt besonders über mangelnde Unterstützung eines Akteurs: Des Sicherheitsrates selbst. Dieser hat auf die bislang acht Meldungen des IStGH wegen des Verstoßes gegen Kooperationspflichten nicht reagiert, nicht einmal den Eingang bestätigt. Die Anklägerin zitiert Stellungnahmen von Kammern des IStGH und der Vertragsstaatenversammlung, um die Dringlichkeit ihres Anliegens zu unterstreichen. Zuletzt hat die Vertragsstaatenversammlung im November 2013 betont, wie wichtig ein verbessertes follow-up zu Überweisungen des Sicherheitsrates sei (Resolution ICC-ASP/12/Res.8, Rn. 12). Die Versammlung hat die Mitgliedstaaten aufgefordert, nach weiteren Möglichkeiten zu suchen, die Arbeit des IStGH zu unterstützen und macht eine Reihe von Vorschlägen gemacht:

Urges States Parties to explore possibilities for facilitating further cooperation and communication between the Court and international and regional organizations, including by securing adequate and clear mandates when the United Nations Security Council refers situations to the Court, ensuring diplomatic and financial support; cooperation by all United Nations Member States and follow–up of such referrals, as well as taking into account the Court’s mandate in the context of other areas of work of the Security Council, including the drafting of Security Council resolutions on sanctions and relevant thematic debates and resolutions; (Resolution ICC-ASP/12/Res.3, Rn. 13).

Deutlicher weist die Vorverfahrenskammer II auf die Gefahren hin, die der Sicherheitsrat durch mangelnde Unterstützung selbst hervorruft:

In this context, the Chamber wishes to point out that, unlike domestic courts, the ICC has no direct enforcement mechanism in the sense that it lacks a police force. As such, the ICC relies mainly on the States’ cooperation, without which it cannot fulfil its mandate. When the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, refers a situation to the Court as constituting a threat to international peace and security, it is expected that the Council would respond by way of taking such measures which are considered appropriate, if there is an apparent failure on the part of the relevant State Party to the Statute to cooperate in fulfilling the Court’s mandate entrusted to it by the Council. Otherwise, if there is no follow up action on the part of the Security Council, any referral by the Council to the ICC under Chapter VII would never achieve its ultimate goal, namely, to put an end to impunity. Accordingly, any such referral would become futile. (Prosecutor v. Omar al-Bashir, Decision on the Non-compliance of the Republic of Chad with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court Regarding the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, Rn. 22).

Von den 15 Sicherheitsratsmitgliedern, die den Bericht der Anklägerin gehört haben, sind sieben Staaten auch Mitglieder des IStGH (Argentinien, Australien, Frankreich, Guatemala, Luxemburg, Korea und das Vereinigte Königreich). Diese Staaten stehen zumindest in der politischen Pflicht, den IStGH auch im Sicherheitsrat zu unterstützen. Lippenbekenntisse in dieser Richtung gibt es durchaus. So äußert der britische Vertreter:

It is now high time that the Council did so by looking urgently at what it can do to assist the Court so that it can complete the task we gave it when we referred the situation in Darfur to the Court over eight years ago.

Der guatemaltekische Vertreter äußert sich ähnlich, rudert aber in seiner Erklärung umgehend zurück:

We consider it essential to strengthen cooperation between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court. In that context, our delegation hopes that the existing cooperation can be renewed by combining the legal and political perspectives for maintaining international peace and security. That, of course, does not mean that the Court should be politicized or that the Council should be judicialized; rather, the combination of both authorities, each in their respective field of action, could fulfil their common mandate of conflict prevention and combating impunity.

Andere Staaten scheinen eher gewillt zu sein, den IStGH zu untersützen. So nimmt der Vertreter Luxemburgs die Anregung der Vorverfahrenskammer II auf und meint:

We ask all Member States, whether or not they are States parties to the Rome Statute, and all regional and international organizations concerned to cooperate fully with the ICC, as required by resolution 1593 (2005). For its part, the Security Council must ensure effective follow-up of cases referred to the ICC. It must not shirk the inherent responsibility in the cases referred to the Court. Generally, we believe that it is vital to strengthen cooperation between the Council and the ICC. The two institutions are complementary. They pursue the same objectives, each one in the framework of its own mandate: preventing conflict, and combating impunity. We believe that the Council should think about what more it could do to assist the Court, especially to assist the Court to execute the mandates given to it.

One way of helping the Court would be to list individuals under an ICC arrest warrant on the sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005). Another specific measure that the Security Council could take would be to answer the correspondence that the Court has addressed to it on cases of non-cooperation. As recalled by Ms. Bensouda, the Court depends on the cooperation of States in order to be able to discharge its mandate. The silence of the Security Council in that context is not encouraging a change of attitude on the part of the Sudan.

In conclusion, I would like to assure Ms. Fatou Bensouda of the full support of Luxembourg in the resolute action that her Office continues to conduct to combat impunity. We associate ourselves with her vibrant appeal for stronger action from the Security Council and States parties to the Rome Statute so that justice can finally be done for the victims of the Darfur conf lict.

Der australische Vertreter betont, dass der Sicherheitsrat sich seiner Überweisungsverantwortung bewusst sein müsse:

The time has well and truly arrived for the Council to take concrete steps to assist the Court in relation to the situation in Darfur. We need to consider carefully what the Council can do to support the Court, which, after all, is only exercising its jurisdiction as a result of the Council’s referral. As Australia has suggested before and as has been suggested earlier today, one obvious step for the Council to take would be for the Council’s Sudan Sanctions Committee to give greater consideration to how the measures at its disposal could assist the ICC on the execution of the outstanding arrest warrants. But we can do more. We support the view that we need a Council forum for legal experts to discuss ICC matters, so as to strengthen the Council’s cooperation with the Court.Ähnlich äußert sich die Vertreterin Argentiniens.

Die übrigen Mitgliedstaaten des Sicherheitsrates, die keine Vertragsparteien des IStGH-Statuts sind, werden nicht müde zu betonen, dass sie nicht zur Kooperation verpflichtet sind. Da zu den unwilligen Staaten (mindestens) drei ständige Sicherheitsratsmitglieder gehören, dürfte der Sicherheitsrat sein Verhalten kaum ändern. Schärfe Sanktionen stehen nicht zu erwarten.

Ergebnis

Die Freude über den beginnenden Prozess (und über die beiden Überweisungsresolutionen des Sicherheitsrates) wird deutlich getrübt. Ohne Unterstützung des Sicherheitsrates hat ein Nichtvertragsstaat des IStGH-Statuts augenscheinlich keine Strafverfolgung zu fürchten. Eine dritte Situationsüberweisung dürfte beim IStGH daher zu Recht auf wenig Gegenliebe stoßen. Auf den Prozess gegen Banda darf man durchaus gespannt sein.

Die Angriffe auf Blauhelmsoldaten stellen u. U. Kriegsverbrechen dar, die nach Art. 8 Abs. 2 lit. e) iii IStGH-Statut bestraft werden können. Ohne Beispiel ist das nicht, müssen sich doch für einen Angriff auf Blauhelmtruppen ab Mai 2014 zwei Rebellenführer in Den Haag verantworten (hier). Es zeigt sich daran aber auch, wie wirkungslos die Maßnahmen des IStGH manchmal sein können.