As always, the Prosecutor laments on the Council’s inaction and even ignorance of the ICC’s concerns. Not only is the Council still failing to enforce outstanding arrest warrants, the Council has yet to respond to the ICC’s communications. These refer to failures by state parties to fulfil their obligations under international law. Most prominently, the Prosecutor reports on the aftermath of the unfortunate incident in South Africa last year (here and here). In March 2016, the Supreme Court of Appeal had issued a judgement, in essence upholding a prior condemnation of the governments refusal to fulfill its legal obligations (a review of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgement will follow on these pages). The dreadful event in South Africa has not hindered Omar al-Bashir from traveling freely. This includes visits to Djibouti and Uganda – both state parties to the ICC-Statute – as well as non-state parties.

With regard to the Banda-trial, which had been postponed indefinitely (here and here), the Prosecutor can only repeat that there is no new date for a trial. Banda is still on the loose and not likely to appear in The Hague. The OTP monitors ongoing events in Darfur, even though new investigations are not being opened (here, here and here). The Prosecutor cites several incidents in which casualties have been reported, allegedly also by the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces. Whether or not any proceedings will be opened seems to depend on the actions by the Security Council. And because the Council fails to act, it is likely that no new investigations will be opened in the Darfur-situation.

After her briefing, the Council’s members answered. To no surprise, nothing new was stated. Some states reiterated their opposition to the Court while other members reiterated their support for the Court and joined the Prosecutor in her calls for support. As stated, however, no member state took action. And as usual, the Sudanese representative reacted to the report with the old responses of imperialism, injustice, illegality and the fact that the Darfur-situation demands a peaceful solution to be found within a political process. It is noticeable that the Prosecutor and the Sudanese representative had a bigger clash than in past briefings, even if the hostility has not reached the heights of June 2012, when the predecessor of the current Prosecutor and the Sudanese representative had a major and very personal clash (here).

Again, a report of the OTP illustrates the shortcomings of the Darfur-situation and highlights the need to act. And yet again, the Council fails to act and it will continue to fail. In December 2016, when the 24^th report is due, the report will most likely contain the same aspects, with minor changes in detail.

However, with the 20^th report of the Prosecutor being delivered in December 2014 and marking the start into 2015, the prospect of a good year for the Darfur-situation was already dark. In said report, the Prosecutor announced a halt to further investigations into Darfur (here). She cited the missing support by the Security Council as a major drawback in the ICC’s efforts with regard to Darfur. In 2015, the Security Council was not impressed by her outcry and continued to ignore the calls for help. This is evident from the new 22^nd report of the OTP to the Security Council. In detail, the Prosecutor highlighted the following points.

Omar a-Bashir’s travels

Unsurprisingly, Sudan’s head of state Omar al-Bashir continues to travel freely. 2015 was marked by a failed attempt to arrest him during an African Union summit in South Africa (here and here). Still, the second half of 2015 had al-Bashir travel to Mauretania, China, South Sudan, Algeria, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India and the United Arab Emirates. Not one of these nine states is a state party to the ICC; thus, they are not obliged to arrest al-Bashir. Nevertheless, the referral by the Security Council asked non-member-states to cooperate with the ICC. With regard to the defiance by South Africa in the summer of 2015, this member state is currently asked to detail the domestic judicial proceedings surrounding the AU summit. Whether or not something helpful will come out of that remains to be seen.

Lack of cooperation

As usual, two key actors refuse to cooperate with the ICC, rendering its efforts useless and hampering the enforcement of international criminal justice.

First, Sudan is still not cooperating with the Court. Albeit obliged to do so by Security Council res. 1593 (2005), Sudan is not willing to fulfill its obligations under international law. This is nothing new and it does not need to be stressed further.

As an interesting side note, the Sudanese representative has cited the November 2015 Paris Climate Change Conference and its impact on the conflict in Darfur. With climate change being one cause for the deterioration of the situation in Darfur, he highlights the need for a comprehensive approach. While the representative has a point, other factors are more essential. While climate change has contributed to clashes between different groups of people in Darfur, the real driving forces behind the conflict are not natural forces, but politics and policies. This, of course, is withhold by the Sudanese representative.

Second, the Security Council is still not willing to back up its referral. In spite of numerous of its own resolutions and several and regular cries for help by the ICC, the Court’s submissions to the Council continue to be ignored. Communications received by the Council are not answered. Within the debate following the report by the Prosecutor, states were reluctant to promise more support. Even France, a long-term supporter of the ICC, prioritizes other aspects of the conflict before addressing the lack of support. It seems as if the Council’s member states have lost their faith in international criminal justice (which is due to its own failure to act).

Further activities

As she promised earlier (here) the Prosecutor monitors ongoing events in Darfur. Within the last six months there have been aerial attacks in Darfur, gender-based crimes and crimes against peace-keepers. The Prosecutor specifies in her report that nobody really knows how many of these crimes are due to the conflict between the government and rebel forces or to intertribal clashes. Unfortunately, these events will not be investigated any further until more support is granted by the international community.

The Prosecutor adds that eight victims of alleged crimes have withdrawn from the al-Bashir case, citing a confidential settlement. She is eager to point out that her office is not abandoning the victims and continues to call for arrest and surrender of those allegedly responsible for the crimes.

Remarkably, the report is silent on the incident at Tabit. Whatever happened there will probably never be known (more here). Finally, the case against Abdallah Banda is not moving forward. A new starting date has not been set and Banda is still on the lose.

Summary

In the end, the 22^nd report does not bring anything new. The situation is still on hold due to the Sudan and the Security Council continuing to ignore the ICC. One does not need to be a prophet to foresee that the 23^rd report due in June 2016 will include the same areas of concern, the same lack of cooperation by Sudan and the same lack of support by the Security Council.

The report comes after a diplomatic brawl over an attempt to arrest Omar al-Bashir during an African Union summit in South Africa (more in analysis no. 15).

The failed attempt to arrest Omar al-Bashir

In June 2015 the AU held a summit in South Africa. Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, was representing his state at the summit. Despite two arrest warrants by the ICC on accounts of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, al-Bashir enjoys the support of many African states, including the AU which has repeatedly criticized the ICC’s policy with regard to Africa. He travels freely throughout the continent. In light of that history, it is not surprising that the president visited the AU summit.

Still, South Africa is a state party to the ICC-statute. As such, there is no doubt that South Africa is under an obligation to arrest Omar al-Bashir. This has not only been hold by several non-governmental organizations, but by the ICC as well: The ICC had consultations with South African Officials in which the obligation of South Africa to arrest Omar al-Bashir was discussed. (Registry Report on the consultations undertaken under Article 97 of the Rome Statute by the Republic of South Africa and the departure of Omar Al Bashir from South Africa on 15 June 2015, ICC-02/05-01/09-243).

In addition, a domestic court found clear words for the South African government. After the North Gauteng High Court in Pretoria found the government of South Africa under a domestic obligation to arrest Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s president managed to board a plane and leave the country for Sudan. In the end, it is evident that the South African government’s failure to act constitutes a violation of the Rome Statute (cf. here).

No immunity for Omar al-Bashir

Also, Omar al-Bashir has as a sitting head of state no immunity from criminal prosecution. Customary international law may provide for such a immunity. However, for state parties to the Rome Statute, art. 27 removes this protection. Sudan, a non-member state, is not bound by art. 27 Rome Statute and thus al-Bashir is not stripped of his immunity by this provision. However, being a member state of the UN, Sudan must adhere to chapter VII-resolutions of the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council removed his immunity by Res. 1593 (2005), which referred to the Rome Statute (cf. here)

Troubling is the stance of several members of the Security Council, including permanent members of the Council as well as elected members and state parties to the ICC-statute, who maintain that al-Bashir is immune from the ICC’s prosecution. In this sense, their view is simply incorrect and Omar al-Bashir does not enjoy immunity from the ICC’s jurisdiction.

It comes to no surprise that the Sudanese government failed to arrest Omar al-Bashir and Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, the Sudanese minister of defense. With regard to al-Bashir, the Court already issued a decision, holding that the non-compliance violates international obligations of Sudan. With regard to Hussein, the decision is pending.

In this sense, the report does not report any news.

Banda-Trial postponed indefinitely

The Prosecutor is also not able to report any news in the Banda-case. He is still on the run and a date for the trial has not been set (cf. here).

Continued hibernation in light of ongoing violence

In her last report the Prosecutor announced a halt to all investigations in Darfur. In the present report, she details her strategy a little more: Resources of the OTP are allocated to prioritized cases that are more advanced. With regard to Darfur, not a single case is likely to be tried in the near future. However, the OTP continues to monitor the situation in Darfur, focusing on recent crimes and even interviewing witnesses to safe their testimony.

This is in part due to the ongoing violence in Darfur, as the Prosecutor reports. Until today, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary unit, are committing crimes in Darfur. The Prosecutor names three individuals allegedly somehow responsible. Among them are two RSF-leaders, Major General Abdual-Aziz and commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as “Hemeti”, and the National Intelligence Security Service’s (NISS) General Ali al-Nasih al-Galla. Hemeti has been in the focus of the OTP for quite some time and was mentioned in the Prosecutor’s 19^th report a year ago.

Of course, during the debate after the Prosecutor gave her report to the Security Council, the Sudanese representative denounced these claims. He even went so far as to re-address the legitimacy and legality of SC Res. 1593 (2005).

(No) Mass rape in Tabit?

Suspiciously, any reference to the alleged mass rape in Tabit is missing from the OTP’s report (cf. here and here). The sole representative regularly referring to the incident is the UK representative. When the Security Council extended the mandate of UNAMID with Res. 2228 (2015) on the same day as the Prosecutor delivered her report, the UK representative reiterated her countries worries about the incident (and she was supported by the US representative). The Sudanese representative, quite the reverse, denounced these allegations and labeled the accusations an “information war” by “certain players to scale up pressure on the Sudan.”

Persistently ignoring the ICC

Not surprising, but disturbing is the persistent neglect of the Darfur-situation by the Security Council. Six months after the Prosecutor’s surrender to the unwillingness of the Council, its members seem happy with the situation. Even tough some members call upon the Council to act, no one undertakes credible steps. For the nearly 1.200 victims of the crime in Darfur since the beginning of 2015, the Security Council is still a disappointment.

The 20^th report of the prosecution to the Security Council is basically limited to issues already known. In addition to the aforementioned announcement, other developments complicate the ICC’s work.

Banda-Trial postponed

The trial against Banda was supposed to begin in May, however, Trail Chamber IV postponed the commencement until 18 November 2014 (here). Still, this date was not realizable as well. When the Trail Chamber IV issued a warrant of arrest for Banda (more will follow in this blog), the Chamber simultaneously vacated the set date and postponed the begin until his arrest or voluntary appearance. This is also due to the unwillingness of Sudan to cooperate with the Court.

The Prosecutor gives one example which speaks volumes: In July 2014, the Court requested Sudan to cooperate and to facilitate Banda’s appearance before the Court. Sudan is by international law, namely by Security Council resolution 1593 (2005), bound to cooperate with the ICC. This being the case, the request to cooperate by the ICC did not impose new obligations on Sudan. Coming back to the example, Sudan returned the envelope with the written request unopened to the Court. The disrespect for the Court as well as the Security Council could not have been expressed more pretentiously. Unfortunately, while the ICC cares, the Security Council has forsaken the Court and is once again not interested in successful international criminal justice.

Omar al-Bashir’s Travels

This is clear from the Council’s reluctance to address the issue of non-cooperation by other states. More specifically, state parties to the ICC-Statute are bound to cooperate with the Court. In particular, those states are under an obligation to arrest persons wanted with an arrest warrant by the ICC. Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s president, is one of those persons. Nevertheless, he travels freely throughout Africa and even African state parties to the ICC decline any request for help by the ICC. This is not new. It is also not new that the Security Council does not support the ICC. Moreover, the communications sent by the ICC to the Council, addressing instances of non-compliance with the Council’s own resolution, are ignored. The ICC still awaits responses to its letters.

The statements by the member’s of the Security Council after the OTP’s report are hypocritical. Some representatives concede that answers are necessary. However, nothing has been done in order to answer the requests. It seems highly unlikely that this will happen in the future.

Alleged Mass Rape in Tabita and UNAMID-reporting

“The recent allegations of rape of approximately 200 women and girls in Tabit should shock this Council into action.” With these clear words the Prosecutor addressed the Security Council and its “concerns” regarding the humanitarian situation in Darfur. The answer of the Council? Some members deny the facts and maintain that no evidence has been found to support this claim. Other members point out that no independent inquiry took place, because the Sudanese government did not grant access.

This comes in addition to alleged flawed reporting by UNAMID. The mission has been criticized for taking sides in the conflict and shielding government officials from prosecution (based on a series of three articles by Foreign Policy: 1, 2 and 3). The Prosecutor addresses the issue only briefly, referring to a report prepared for the Secretary General (here). The report found no evidence “to support the allegation that UNAMID had intentionally sought to cover up crimes against civilians and peacekeepers.” However, the report also found that in several instances UNAMID did not provide UN Headquarters with all information about the incidents. (To be fair to the Security Council, when it renewed UNAMID’s mandate until summer 2015 by resolution 2173 (2015), it welcomed the Secretary Genereal’s announcement to investigate said allegations.)

Grim Outlook on the 21^st report

It does not take a crystal ball to have a grim outlook on the next report. After all, we have seen what happens after the prosecution begs for support in New York. In June 2015 the OTP will once again lament on the lack of cooperation by Sudan and other states, the Security Council’s unwillingness to address instances of non-cooperation as well as the further postponement of trials and execution of arrest warrants. That the OTP continues to monitor alleged crimes in Darfur does not brighten the outlook and it does certainly not help the people in Darfur.

Media-coverage vs. UN-statements

Interestingly enough, while news outlets put the news straight (New York Times: “Prosecutor halts Darfur inquiry“, Washington Post: “ICC prosecutor stopping Darfur investigations“, al Jazeera: “ICC prosecutor halts Darfur war-crimes probe“), the UN is somewhat ashamed. The UN news centre headlines “Security Council inaction on Darfur ‘can only embolden perpetrators’ – ICC prosecutor” and the meetings coverage of the Security Council captions the meeting with “Amid Growing Brutality in Darfur, International Criminal Court Prosecutor Urges Security Council to Rethink Tactics for Arresting War Crime Suspects“.

Second serious blow to OTP

Just a few days earlier the OTP had to close the investigation against Uhuru Kenyatta because it could not provide evidence as required by the Pre-Trial-Chamber in order to proceed with the case.

Presidency of the Security Council

It renders the stop in the Darfur-situation delicate that the Presidency of the Security Council during December is held by Chad, a country neighbouring Darfur and, although a state party, refusing to cooperate with the ICC.

I’m quite certain the Security Council would have preferred the Darfur investigation to continue ad infinitum: as long as the OTP is trying to investigate, the ICC will get the lion’s share of the blame for the failure to get Bashir. Now Bensouda has cleverly shifted the terrain, making it clear that the problem is the Security Council, not the ICC. Whether the Security Council will care is an open question — but at least Bensouda will take some of the heat off the ICC regarding Darfur. The last thing the Court needs now is additional bad publicity…

Nevertheless, it’s troubling. When the Security Council referred the situation to the ICC, it was widely applauded for a step that seemed unlikely just three years prior. Now, international criminal justice, the Security Council and the Court have surrendered to international opposition. Omar al-Bashir already presented himself and the Sudanese people as the victors against a colonialist tool to humiliate and subjugate the country.

Whether or not the Prosecutor’s strategy will pay off will be seen in the future. A major obstacle has been China as a permanent member to the Security Council. China has financial interests in Sudan and imports a large share of its oil from the country. In my view, it is unlikely that interests of criminal justice, which have not prevailed in the past, will now suddenly overwhelm the government in Beijing.

This blog will feature an analysis of the 20th report as soon as it becomes available.

Prozess gegen Banda soll im November beginnen

Dabei bestand im Dezember 2013 durchaus Anlass zur Hoffnung: Der erste Prozess gegen den Beschuldigen Abdallah Banda sollte am 5. Mai 2014 eröffnet werden. Doch aufgrund logistischer Schwierigkeiten, die unter anderem Übersetzungsproblemen geschuldet sein sollen, wurde der Prozessbeginn zunächst auf unbestimmte Zeit verschoben. Die Verteidigung meinte, in einem Jahr starten zu können, während die Anklägerin auf einen Beginn im Oktober 2014 drängte. Gestern, am 14. Juli, hat die VorvVerfahrenskammer IV den Prozessbeginn auf den 18. November 2014 festgelegt. Wie die Kammer ihre Entscheidung begründet, kann leider der offenen Version der Entscheidung nicht entnommen werden. Ob es bei dem Termin bleiben wird, bleibt abzuwarten.

Weitere Staatsbesuche von Omar al-Bashir…

Frustriert bleibt die Anklägerin von den zahlreichen Staatsbesuchen des sudanesischen Präsidenten Omar al-Bashir der auch im letzten Berichtszeitraum Reisen sowohl in Vertragsstaaten des IStGH-Statuts als auch in Nichtvertragsstaaten unternommen hat (dazu auch hier und hier).

Die Vertragsstaaten des Status sind dabei über das IStGH-Statut und die Sicherheitsratsresolution 1593 (2005) zur Kooperation verpflichtet. Im Fokus des Berichts steht vor allem der Besuch al-Bashirs in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo zu Beginn des Jahres.

Die Nichtvertragsparteien sind hingegen nicht zur Kooperation verpflichtet, auch wenn der Sicherheitsrat in der besagten Überweisungsresolution 1593 (2005) die Staaten zu eben dieser Kooperation angehalten hat. Im Jahr 2014 war al-Bashir unter anderem in Äthiopien und Kuwait, beides sind keine Vertragsstaaten des Statuts.

…und weiter mangelnde Unterstützung der internationalen Gemeinschaft

Leider wird al-Bashir auch in Zukunft weiter unbehelligt durch Afrika und den Rest der Welt reisen können.

Dafür ist vor allem der Sicherheitsrat selbst verantwortlich. Wie sowohl die Kammern des Gerichtshofs als auch die Anklägerin bereits mehrfach betont haben, hängen effektive Strafverfolgung und ultimativ die Glaubwürdigkeit von Strafgerichtshof und Sicherheitsrat von einer wirksamen Nachsorge des Sicherheitsrats ab. Ohne eigene Vollstreckungsorgane ist der Gerichtshof tatsächlich vor allem davon abhängig, dass der Sicherheitsrat Ernst macht und den Staaten und Organen des IStGH eine völkerrechtliche Rechtsgrundlage an die Hand gibt oder die Verfahren anderweitig unterstützt. Dazu können verschärfte Sanktionen gegen den Sudan selbst oder auch gegen solche Vertragsstaaten des IStGH gehören, die ihren Verpflichtungen nicht nachkommen. Erstaunlich ist in diesem Zusammenhang auch die Hilflosigkeit der Vertragsstaatenversammlung, die Vertragsbrüche immer wieder toleriert.

Wie bereist erwähnt sind Änderungen nicht zu erwarten. Den Versprechen der Sicherheitsratsmitglieder, den IStGH zu unterstützen, kann man keinen Glauben schenken. Dabei muss man nicht so weit gehen, auf die fehlende Nachsorge zu verweisen. Denn inzwischen haben die Kammern des IStGH allein in der Darfur-Situation acht Mitteilungen über mangelnde Kooperationsgemeinschaft an den Sicherheitsrat gemacht. Deren Eingang ist bislang nicht einmal bestätigt worden, geschweige denn hat eine inhaltliche Auseinandersetzung damit stattgefunden.

Darüber hinaus ist die Anregung der Anklägerin, diplomatische Beziehungen mit dem Sudan (auch von Seiten der UN) auf der Ebene von “non-essential contacts” zu suspendieren, nicht aufgenommen worden. Im Ergebnis, so die Anklägerin zu Recht, verpuffen die bislang 55 Sicherheitsratsresolutionen in Bezug auf Darfur. Deutlich wird dies auch daran, dass kein Vertreter des Sudan an der Sitzung des Sicherheitsrates teilgenommen hat. Damit straft der Sudan den IStGH mit Nichtachtung.

Auch bleiben die Afrikanische Union (AU) und ihre Mitgliedstaaten auf Konfrontationskurs zum IStGH. Die AU bekräftigt regelmäßig ihre Entschlossenheit, nicht mit dem IStGH zu kooperieren. Nur wenige Tage nach dem Bericht der Anklägerin haben die Mitgliedstaaten beschlossen, amtliche Immunität auch vor dem neuen Afrikanischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte gelten zu lassen.

Auf Hilfe dürfen daher weder die Menschen in Darfur noch die Organe des Gerichtshofs hoffen.

Verschlechterung der humanitären Situation in Darfur

Hilfe ist dabei dringend erforderlich, um die Lage zu verbessern. Seit Jahresbeginn 2014 sind mehrere hunderttausend Menschen vertrieben worden. Der Bericht spricht von mehr als 250.000 Menschen, wobei anderen Quellen zufolge ungefähr 320.000 Menschen ihre Heimat verlassen mussten.

Seit Jahresbeginn kommt es vermehrt zu Kämpfen. Die Anklägerin schildert diese in eindrucksvoller Weise und hebt die Operationen der Rapid Support Forces (RSF) besonders hervor. Die RSF sind eine paramilitärische Gruppe, die im Auftrag der sudanesischen Zentralregierung in Darfur kämpft. Dabei fällt der Name eines Kommandieren, Mohamed Hamdan, der auch als “Hemeti” bekannt ist, immer wieder. Zwischen den Zeilen liest man, dass Hemeti ggf. als nächster mit einem Haftbefehl zu rechnen hat. Dass dies ein sinnvoller Schritt ist, muss im Angesichts der Wirkungslosigkeit der Strafverfolgung bezweifelt werden. Hemeti hätte, soviel steht fest, wenig Grund, Den Haag zu fürchten.

Im Ergebnis bringt auch der 19. Bericht nichts Neues und vor allem keine Lösung für die Schwierigkeiten, vor denen der IStGH steht. Ob der Prozess gegen Banda tatsächlich im November starten wird, bleibt abzuwarten. Dass die Anklägerin bei ihrem 20. Bericht im Dezember wieder die Untätigkeit des Sicherheitsrates beklagen wird, ist dagegen keine gewagte Voraussage.

The Prosecutor attacks…

The prosecutor starts matter-of-factly with a brief overview of the ICC’s actions since the last report of December 2011 (read more here). He explains the steps taken; special emphasis is put on the failure of Sudan to cooperate with the ICC and on the new warrant of arrest issued against the Sudanese incumbent minister of defense, Abdel Hussein (read more here). In the course of the report, his words become tangy and more emotional. The prosecutor claims that the Security Council’s authority and credibility is challenged by the defiance of the ICC by Sudan: Four suspects remain in governmental functions while no domestic procedure is being conducted. In addition, the African Union and Arab League openly oppose any enforcement of the arrest warrant against Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s president wanted for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The prosecutor seizes the chance and calls upon the self-perception and ‘honor’ of the Council’s members: Here is a chance to show the determination and power of the Security Council. Between the lines he even suggests that the Council may take military measures to ensure Sudan’s compliance with its international obligations. In addition, an armed conflict between Sudan and South Sudan is imminent. This conflict would have alarming consequences for Darfur (read more here). What really got the minds going was the final statement of the prosecutor. After listening to the Sudanese ambassador, the prosecutor claimed that the speech denying the crimes in Darfur could be considered a part of these crimes and thus the ambassador is on notice for further criminal investigation.

…and the Sudanese Ambassador responds…

Such words cannot go unanswered. Consequently the Sudanese permanent representative responds in equally harsh words, refutes the allegations and attacks the prosecutor. The “terrorist’s” statement, given in an “emotional state” as a result of pointing out “his conduct and his lack of credibility” tries to “silence the voice of justice”. This shows his biased approach in which he “has tackled all of these issues – in a totally illegal, immoral and illogical manner, to the extent of intimidation and terrorization.” At least the current government of Sudan is elected and supported by the majority of the Sudanese constituency, its members are being prosecuted, whilst the rebels are neither elected nor prosecuted, states the prosecutor. And while the prosecutor talks about genocide and ethnic cleansing, international investigators have not found any evidence supporting this conclusion.

…while the International Community fails to act.

The members of the Security Council are divided on the ICC’s handling of the case. Some states fully support the ICC while others limit their support to the Darfur-situation, mainly because they are non-member-states to the ICC. Most importantly, some states prefer a political solution to the crisis and doubt that the ICC’s actions do any good. And while some states claim that the arrest warrants must be enforced, one must doubt that the Security Council will take any action. Given his past record, the Council has provided basically no help for the ICC in seven years. Interestingly, the prosecutor’s concern regarding the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan was shared by many states. Given that al-Bashir, Hussein and Harun, key-figures of the Darfur-conflict, are also key-figures in the current conflict with the southern neighbor, the international community must keep not one, but two eyes on this conflict.

To conclude, the prosecutor and the ambassador spoke true words in the Council. It is regrettable that the arrest warrants are not taken seriously by all states. It is equally regrettable that the prosecutor did not address the rebels, for there are proceedings against rebel leaders. The ambassador’s critique that the ICC lacks jurisdiction over the non-state-party Sudan cannot be upheld in light of resolution 1593 (2005). The International Commission of Inquiry under the leadership of Antonio Cassese has really not found any evidence regarding genocide – but its conclusion was based on the lack of evidence, and it did not exclude the possibility of genocide. The ambassador is not the only one advising the prosecutor not to base his investigations on individuals in the spotlight of the media. Instead, critics maintain, he should also keep in mind that these arrest warrants must be enforced and that every warrant of arrest not enforced damages the ICC’s authority and credibility more than the prosecution of only ‘minor’ suspects. The prosecutor’s thoughtless answer to the Sudanese ambassador should have never been uttered. It is somewhat ridiculous to compare the denial of crimes with their actual perpetration. Art. 25 (3) ICC-Statute, on which the prosecutor’s claim is based, provides no mode of perpetration through retrospectively denying crimes. Most importantly, it is a shame that several suspects remain at large and that the Security Council fails again in enforcing them. It is not only the obligation of Sudan to cooperate, it is also the moral, if not legal obligation of the international community to support the ICC.

Update: This analysis has been released as Bofax Nr. 405E by the Ruhr-University Bochum and can be downloaded here.

Neuer Verdächtiger

Zu Beginn berichtet der Ankläger davon, dass ein Haftbefehl gegen einen weiteren Verdächtigen beantragt worden sei. Der derzeitige Verteidigungsminister des Sudan Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein stehe unter Verdacht, zu Beginn des Krieges Kriegsverbrechen und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit befohlen zu haben. Die Vorwürfe deckten sich dabei mit denen gegen Ahmed Harun und Ali Kushayb (vgl. Analyse Nr. 2).

Hussein war zu Beginn des Darfur-Kinfliktes Innenminister des Sudan und Sonderrepräsentant des Präsidenten in Darfur, ausgestattet mit allen präsidialen Kompetenzen. Einige dieser Kompetenzen soll Hussein an Harun delegiert haben. Hussein sei somit verantwortlich für die Taten des Sicherheitsapparates in Darfur.

Es ist zu begrüßen, dass der Ankläger einen weiteren Verdächtigen, der noch immer in Regierungsverantwortung steht, benannt hat und ein Verfahren gegen diesen anstrengt. Weniger begrüßenswert ist es, dass der Antrag ausdrücklich auch ergeht, um die sudanesische Zentralregierung dazu zu bewegen, Ahmed Harun zu verhaften und an den IStGH auszuliefern.

Stand der laufenden Verfahren

Das Verfahren gegen Banda und Jerbo werde derzeit weiter vorbereitet. Als möglichen Termin für den Start der mündlichen Verhandlung nannte der Ankläger die erste Jahreshälfte 2012. Allerdings habe man sich auf einige wenige Punkte geeinigt, die verhandelt werden sollen. Es geht dabei vor allem um den Angriff auf einen Stützpunkt der AU in Haskanita im September 2007. Sollte der Gerichtshof feststellen, dass die AMIS sich rechtmäßig in Darfur aufgehalten haben, dann sei der Angriff unrechtmäßig – die Verdächtigen stellen in Aussicht, sich in diesem Fall schuldig zu bekennen. Der Ankläger nimmt leider keine Stellung zum Verfahrensstand der anderen Fälle. Dies ist misslich, müssen diese Verfahren doch auch vorangetrieben werden.

Überwachung der Situation in Darfur

Allem voran überwache die Anklagebehörde die Tätigkeiten des Verteidigungsministeriums und dessen Chef. Es bestehe weiterhin die Gefahr, dass dieser seine Position ausnutze, um Verbrechen zu begehen. Daneben bestehe der Verdacht auf Verbrechen gegen humanitäre Helfer in Darfur und auf den Einsatz von Kindersoldaten.

Seine tiefe Besorgnis drückt der Ankläger auch über Vorfälle aus, in denen Zivilisten direkt angegriffen wurden. Nach humanitärem Völkerrecht ist dies grundsätzlich verboten und streng zu ahnden. Insoweit ist dem Ankläger zuzustimmen.

Verstoß gegen Kooperationspflichten

Anfang dieser Woche hat die Vorverfahrenskammer I des IStGH festgestellt, dass sowohl Malawi (hier) als auch der Tschad (hier) gegen ihre Kooperationspflichten verstoßen hätten, indem sie Omar al-Bashir bei dessen Besuch in ihren Staaten nicht festgenommen und an den IStGH überstellt hätten. Eine gewohnheitsrechtliche Ausnahme von der Immunität amtierender Staatsoberhäupter bestehe nicht. Diese Entscheidung ist im Ergebnis zu begrüßen. Denn auf jeden Fall hat der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen eine etwaige Immunität al-Bashirs durch die Überweisungsresolution 1593 (2005) aufgehoben. Allerdings ist fraglich, ob eine solche Immunität wirklich besteht (zur näheren Begründung s. meine Ausführungen hier auf S. 791).