Three days ago the ICC officially notified the UN Security Council of the failure of Djibouti and Uganda to arrest Omar al-Bashir while he was present in these two countries. Both are state parties to the ICC and thus obliged by treaty law to arrest al-Bashir due to an arrest warrant by the ICC. This is not the first time a state party has failed to do so.

Today, Rwanda has reiterated its invitation to the Sudanese President, who is supposed to attend an AU summit in Kigali starting tomorrow. Even though Rwanda is not a state party to the ICC and consequently under no obligation to arrest the president, it shows the respect that states have for the ICC, which at least in most parts of Africa is not-existent.

The UN Security Council will probably ignore the communications referring to Uganda and Djibouti and it will most likely ignore al-Bashir’s attendance of the AU-summit.

Every six months, the Prosecutor of the ICC reports to the UN Security Council on the Darfur-situation. Every six months, the Prosecutor brings no news and repeats her calls for help. Every six months, the members of the Security Council agree and disagree on her report and criticism, albeit they agree to not act upon her calls. In June 2016, the Prosecutor delivered her 23rd report about the situation in Darfur. And very similar to the 22nd report (here) she cannot deliver real news; too few developments took place while “grave crimes continue to be committed in Darfur” (Statement of the ICC Prosecutor). Den Rest des Artikels lesen >

2015 marked the tenth anniversary of the Security Council`s resolution 1593 (2005), referring the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the International Criminal Court (here). With the year that could have been a jubilee for the ICC coming to a close, the Prosecutor of the ICC recently delivered her semi-annual report to the UN Security Council. Den Rest des Artikels lesen >

Six months after her last devastating report on the Situation in Darfur, Sudan, (more herehere and here) the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court delivered her 21st report to the UN Security Council in June 2015, updating the Council’s member to new activities.

The report comes after a diplomatic brawl over an attempt to arrest Omar al-Bashir during an African Union summit in South Africa (more in analysis no. 15).

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Very briefly: Whether or not Omar al-Bashi is still in South Africa is unknown. As soon as the South African Judgment becomes available, it will be analyzed here.

When the Security Council referred the Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2005, it was widely applauded for a resolution that seemed highly unlikely just a few years before. During the last years, however, the sloppy treatment of Darfur by the Security Council has made the Office of the Prosecutor more and more desperate. In several reports to the Council, the OTP has complained about the lack of engagement by the Security Council (here, here, here and here). Ultimately, this behavior lead the OTP to put a halt to investigations in Darfur in December 2014 (here and here). Den Rest des Artikels lesen >

Die halbjährlichen Berichte über den Fortgang der Darfur-Situation an den Sicherheitsrat unterscheiden sich kaum noch voneinander. Zuletzt hatte die Chefanklägerin im Sommer 2013 kleinere Fortschritte in einem Strafverfahren vermelden können, während alle anderen Verfahren still standen. An dieser Situation hat sich kaum etwas geändert, wie der nunmehr 18. Bericht der Anklägerin vom Dezember 2013 an den Sicherheitsrat zeigt. Den Rest des Artikels lesen >

Eigentlich sollte im Juli der nächsten Gipfel der Afrikanischen Union (AU) in Malawi stattfinden. Diese Veranstaltung wurde nunmehr von Malawi abgesagt, berichtet Al Jazeera. Grund dafür ist, dass die übrigen Mitgliedstaaten der AU darauf bestanden haben, Omar al-Bashir zu dem Gipfel einzuladen. Den Rest des Artikels lesen >

Die FAZ berichtet heute über den Besuch von Omar al-Bashir in China.

Bashir, der mit einem Haftbefehl wegen Völkermord, Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit und Kriegsverbrechen gesucht wird, reiste nach China, um die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen den beiden Staaten zu stärken. China stellt für den Sudan den wohl wichtigsten Handelspartner dar. Die Chinesen beziehen den Löwenanteil des sudanesischen Öls, der einen deutlichen Anteil ihres eigenen Ölimports ausmacht.

Ganz abgesehen von dem Haftbefehl sind diese Beziehungen aber gespannt: In den nächsten Tagen wird der Südsudan unabhängi. Im Südsudan aber befinden sich aber die großen sudanesischen Ölvorkommen. China ist daher an einem guten, zumindest friedlichen, Verhältnis der beiden sudanesischen Staaten gelegen (zu den letzten Konflikten siehe hier).

Der Haftbefehl selbst kann den Chinesen rechtlich gleichgültig sein, denn weder ist China Vertragspartei des IStGH-Statuts noch ist China über die Res. 1593 (2005) zur Kooperation mit dem Gerichtshof verpflichtet.